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Abstract
Unilateral divorce catalyzes the dissolution of unstable mar-
riages and reorganizing better ones. To examine how unilat-
eral divorce affects marital duration, we develop a simple DID
stochastic dominance comparison across legal regimes and mar-
ital cohorts. This DID comparison identifies that unilateral di-
vorce catalyzes the dissolution of unstable marriages; more im-
portantly, remarriages after the termination of first marriages
also undergo significantly faster in the unilateral regime. We
study the underlying mechanism using a parsimonious unitary
model of marriage-remarriage cycle with three features: 1) on-
the-job (marriage) search (OJS); 2) marital investment; 3) OJS
feedbacks as an exogenous spousal separation event in the equi-
librium. Under unilateral divorce, the lowered time cost involved
in separation results in front-loaded OJS.
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1 Introduction
Rather than ”Till death do us part”, ”Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage”
(Cherlin, 2009) better describes American marriages since the later half
of the 20th century — almost half of the modern American couples
eventually divorce, yet more than half of the divorcees remarry within
a few years. In the formation of this modern marriage cycle, the
divorce rate rose by more than 200% during the 1970s.1 Concurrently,
unilateral divorce was being introduced throughout the states; with
divorces made easier, unilateral divorce was said to unintentionally
caused the observed ”breakdown of American marriages and families”
(Weitzman, 1985).
Weitzman’s critique was influential within academia, drawing the
attention of many family researchers discussing its empirical validity
(Peters, 1986, 1992; Allen, 1992; Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006); it is
also found that unilateral divorce significantly hurt the welfare of
children whose parents experienced divorce (Gruber, 2004). While in
sharp contrast, policy-makers have never treated unilateral divorce
as a Pandora’s Box — the rollout of unilateral divorce has faced no
serious opposition, and that no states have ever turned back to the
consensus regime.2 As we argue, this smooth policy rollout could be
due to a pro-unilateral divorce argument: Unilateral divorce catalyzes
the dissolution of undesirable marriages, allowing suffering couples
to separate earlier; after divorce, the involved parties can form a
better remarriage. Hence, rather than just breaking down marriages,
unilateral divorce reconstructs them.
Given this background, we examine whether unilateral divorce
catalyzes the marriage life-cycle a` la Cherlin (2009); and if so, how. To
this end, we quantify how unilateral divorce affects both the duration
of the first marriage and the time to the second marriage since first
marriage termination. As a study of divorce timing, our primary statis-
tic of concern is the marital duration condition on eventual divorces.
1See Figure 1 in Gruber (2004).
2The transition to unilateral divorce is now complete, with New York being the
last state having unilateral divorce since 2010.This smooth rollout earns unilateral
divorce a name of ”Silent Revolution” (Jacob, 1988). Even Weitzman (1985) highlights
that unilateral divorce reduce hostility and suffering; she does not recommend
abolishing unilateral divorce, but rather alleviating its side effects instead.
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This focus sets this paper apart from the previous empirical literature
on unilateral divorce, that concerns the divorce rate instead.3
For identification, we need to control for common time trend
and static differences in marital durations across states. So we de-
velop a simple extension of stochastic dominance comparison as a
difference-in-difference design (DID), and apply it with respect to
legal regime and marital cohort. Like the standard DID, this method
can be expressed as a regression. Hence controlling for observables is
straightforward.
Using this research design, we find that unilateral divorce disso-
lutes unstable marriages: Among relatively unstable marriages with
duration less than or equal to 10 years, being the unilateral regime
shortens the average marital duration by 0.7 years; the remaining mar-
riages are more stable through selection, such that among marriages
that have a duration exceeding 10 years, their average duration is
lengthened. Whereas after the termination of the first marriage, the
unilateral regime has a 10% larger remarriage probability within 3
years relative to the consensus regime — a surprising result if unilat-
eral divorce mechanically shortens the divorce process; whereas this
finding is consistent with a hypothesis that, before the termination
of the first marriage, divorcees in the unilateral regime tend to begin
searching for new mates already.
To explain this catalyst effect, we appeal to the seminal work of
Becker et al. (1977), which proposes that marriages can dissolute
due to either exogenous shocks and the arrival of a superior on-the-
marriage (job) offer (hereafter OJS). We construct a dynamic model
of marriage with both mechanisms as two sides of the same coin —
within a couple, OJS reciprocally feedbacks as an exogeneous shock
for the other spouse. As such, this model captures both the catalyst
effect — the married continue to search for better opportunities— as
well as Weitzman (1985)’s concern that some of the divorces could
be involuntary. As one notable feature of our model, divorce takes
time to complete in both regimes, and ends faster in the unilateral
3Some other papers examine marital durations as well, although their focuses
are different. For instance, Lillard (1993) estimates a simulataneous hazard model
of marriage and fertility hazard, in which both variables are interrelated by their
realized state; Georgellis (1996) estimates a hazard model of marriage and pre-
marital cohabitation.
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regime; in a standard OJS model, an accepted OJS offer immediately
take effect.
In the model, a representative agent voluntarily decides to marry
when an offer arrives. During marriage, the representative agent can
engage in marital investment (Stevenson, 2007; Voena, 2015) and also
engage in OJS. Due to either OJS or exogeneous separation, eventually
the representative agent must divorce and restart the marriage cycle.
Tracking the locus of the representative agent results in a steady
state distribution of marriage duration. Because marriage quality
tends increase over time due to marital investment, OJS becomes less
attractive over time. As a result, OJS in this model exhibits negative
duration dependence.
To clarify our main point —the interaction between OJS and mar-
ital investment— our model abstracts away many realistic features,
including age, learning, ex-ante heterogeneity, childbearing, cost of
marriage, and legal costs of divorce.4 Also, we limit ourselves to a
one-sided model instead of modelling the interaction between two
spouses.
Despite the simplicity, this barebone model can already match, to a
first order, both the marriage and divorce rates, as well as the duration
of marriages and time required to have the next marriage in the
United States. To mimic the effect of unilateral divorce, we consider a
comparative static exercise of reducing the length of divorce. There are
several effects. First, it increases the option value of a successful OJS.
Second, it increases the separation due to the equilibrium feedback
mechanism. Third, marital investment decreases due to the reduced
value of marriage. Given these effects, a simulation shows that OJS
is only about 2% among all divorces in the consensus regime, while
the figure rises to about 6% in the unilateral regime. The net welfare,
however, increases by about 10% by switching to the unilateral regime.
4A couple of other papers study the dynamics of marriage and divorce. Fol-
lowing the learning model of Jovanovic (1979), Brien et al. (2006) considers a setup
in which the match quality is unknown ex-ante and reveals gradually, and that
couples may experiment cohabitation as an intermediate marriage arrangement.
Another literature generalizes the frictionless matching framework with ex-ante
heterogeneous agents of Choo and Siow (2006) by adding dynamics, including Bruze
et al. (2014) and Choo (2015); their concern is who matches with whom in a dynamic
context. We limit our discussion by abstracting from these important concerns.
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Thus this model is capable in handling all these issues —both positive
and negative— that has been separately discussed in the previous
literature on unilateral divorce. In a more elaborate version of this
model, we also consider a more realistic case in which OJS offers have
a possibility to expire; it helps explaining the differences between the
two legal regimes.
We own our intellectual debt to two papers. Shi (2016) considers
the first model that combines endogenous job upgrading and on-the-
job search. His model about the labor market explains tenure effects on
wage, the dispersion of wage among ex-ante homogeneous workers,
and also front-loaded OJS. Taking an analogy to the marriage market,
we borrow his idea to generate a non-degenerate marital duration
distribution, and that OJS is front-loaded in the marriage cycle.5
The second paper that inspires our work is Burdett et al. (2004).
That paper builds a model of marriage, in which either or both spouse
can engage in search. If one spouse decides to search, the marriage
become less stable. This makes the choice of staying in marriage being
less attractive, which in turn justify search as the optimal choice. As
a result, excessive turnover can occur among the multiple equilibria.
While we opt for a simpler unitary setup, we capture the same feature
using the equilibrium feedback of OJS.
2 Background
2.1 Unilateral Divorce and OJS
Historically, divorce in the United States could only happen if either
spouse have a fault. Otherwise, divorce was forbidden by law even
with mutual consent between the spouses. Known as the adversary
system, a divorcing couple would need to present evidence of fault
to either spouse to the court, with adultery and physical abuse being
the leading legal grounds. This requirement induced a large number
5Because in the labor market OJS is usually directed, with workers and vacancies
purposefully matching each other instead of being random, Shi (2016) considers a
directed search setup. Whereas we opt for using a random search setup because in
the marriage market there are no observable vacancies, so that the quality of the
outside offer cannot be known before searching.
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of false testimonies among those couples who had mutual consent to
divorce (Wright Jr and Stetson, 1978; Rheinstein, 1971; Marvell, 1989;
Friedman, 2004).
As discussed in Gruber (2004), in the 1950s a legal reform permits
divorces in the absence of faults in the presence of mutual consent
between the spouses; yet still, without in the cases without legal con-
sent, proving faults is necessary. In the 1970-80s, California lawmakers
removed the need for spousal consent in filing no-fault divorce, thus
effectively making divorce unilateral. This practice is soon followed
by a number of other states within the 10-year period, while the rest
defer the switch to the unilateral regime until much later. The simulta-
neous existence of unilateral and consensus states permit a cross-state
comparison between the two legal regimes, thereby identifying the
effects of unilateral divorce.
From a theoretical standpoint, unilateral divorce has been regarded
as neutral to divorce (Peters, 1986). In the unilateral regime, a married
person, being mistreated by his/her spouse, can now make a credi-
ble threat of leaving the household. Though in a transferable utility
framework, the Coase theorem applies — these husbands would ade-
quately compensate their wives, and divorce will not happen unless
the outside option exceeds the total value of the original marriage
(Becker et al., 1977). So as long as unilateral divorce does not gen-
erate extra outside options, neutrality holds. In this regard, most
exogenous shocks considered in the literature — loss in income, job
displacment, disability, well-being shocks (Weiss, 1997; Charles and
Stephens, 2004; Chiappori et al., 2016) — are not directly correlated to
the legal regime.6 While in our model, unilateral divorce reduces the
duration of the divorce process, thus increasing the value of OJS as
an outside option. Consequently, unilateral divorce is non-neutral on
divorce.
As an important remark, OJS can be related to having extramarital
6Weiss (1997) study how unexpected changes in income affects divorce, while
Charles and Stephens (2004) examines job displacement and (unexpected) disability
of one spouse, finding that only the latter matters. Well-being shock is also consid-
ered in the literature. Weiss (1997) assumes that the subjective well-being is constant
and control it using a fixed effect, while Chiappori et al. (2016) uses a particular data
set in Russia that traces simultaneously the labor market outcomes and subjective
well-being data for their joint identification.
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affairs, but the two are conceptually distinct. Fair (1978) considers a
theory of extra-marital affairs in which an economic agent decides
how to spend the time between his/her spouse and his/her paramour
— the context is one that the economic agent maintains a simultaneous
relationship between the two. Consequently, optimality in Fair (1978)
is an interior solution which equalizes the marginal utilities from
engaging in the two activities. Whereas in our model, a successful OJS
—whose value is greater than that of the current marriage— would
lead to divorce of the current marriage.
2.2 Marital Investment
Marital investment in this model is also endogenous. Stevenson (2007)
provides empirical evidence on how unilateral divorce reduces marital-
specific investments. For instance, the paper reports that couples in
the unilateral regime are ”10% less likely to be supporting a spouse
through school. They are 8% more likely to have both spouses em-
ployed in the labor force full time and are 5% more likely to have a
wife in the labor force. Finally, they are about 6% less likely to have
a child.” In our model, Foreseeing that the marriage may end early
due to OJS, it becomes harder to reap the benefit of marital upgrading.
Consequently, couples in the unilateral regime would react by choos-
ing less marital investment. Our model formalizes the essence of her
argument.
Related, Voena (2015) argues that property division under unilat-
eral divorce matters. Some states divide the joint assets equally or
based on equity, while the others states sort to the pre-marriage legal
ownwership of each asset. Due to these legal restrictions, utility is not
perfectly transferable, and hence unilateral divorce may have varied
impact on investment within the household.
Marital upgrading is an essential part in our model. Without it,
marriage quality is fixed for a given marriage until its dissolution.
Consequently, the hazard of OJS is constant with respect to marriage
duration. In turn, this would imply unilateral divorce having a uni-
form catalyst the dissolution of all currently intact marriages, rather
than mostly on the newly weds.
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3 Empirical Strategy
As suggestive evidence, we first examine a plot of the cumulative
density function of marriage duration in Figure 1, reproduced from a
seminal review (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). During the unilateral
divorce reform that largely happened in the 1970s, the 1950-59 marital
cohort has already passed its early years of marriage, so that it is
not affected by the catalyst effect of unilateral divorce; the reverse is
true for the 1970-79 marital cohort.7 Hence by comparing these two
marital cohorts, we can obtain a sense of how the catalyst works. For
the 1950-59 marital cohort, among the eventual divorces in a 15 year
window, about half of them happened within the first 6 years; the
corresponding proportion rises to about two thirds for the 1970-79
marital cohort. As such, eventual divorces happened earlier for the
1970-79 marital cohort relative to the 1950-59 cohort, i.e. the marital
duration distribution becomes more front-loaded over time.
Nevertheless, Figure 1 pools all states together regardless of their
legal regime, and that it is clear that marriages have strong cohort
effects undermine the identification of a catalyst effect from unilateral
divorce. The empirical literature already found unilateral divorce has
little long-run effect on the divorce rate (Wolfers, 2006), despite that the
large concurrent increase in divorce rate; there is no reason to believe
that the cohort effects for marital duration are small. As documented
by Cherlin (2009) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2007), cohort effects
are due to many reasons such as changes in culture, wage structures,
introduction of new household technologies.
To address this issue, we distinguish the states by both cohort
and legal regime, studying marital duration using a difference-in-
difference (DID) identification strategy. We assume that between the
treated states (switchers during 1970-79) and the control states (non-
switchers during 1970-79), their cohort effects —the changes between
1950-59 to 1970-79— are common. A DID estimator eliminates this
common cohort effect and also the fixed heterogeneity in marital
duration between states.
7A marital cohort is defined as the subset of respondents in the data who are
married during the specified time window.
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3.1 Sample Selection, Right Censoring, and Legal Regime
Definitions
This paper uses the data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) 2001. While the SIPP is mainly used for the study
of income and labor force related issues, the data set also contains a
topical module that retrospectively inquires the marital histories of
the survey respondents. Notably, this topical module contains their
exact years of first and second marriages, separation and termination,
if applicable. The topical module also contains some geographic and
contextual variables such as race, gender and education which allows
us to condition our results on them.
The SIPP is repeated annually, and we select the 2001 SIPP for two
reasons. One reason is that in 2001, the median respondents are in
their mid-30s. Many of them were just married during the 1980s, after
the unilateral divorce movement has mostly ended. The second reason
is that this data set since this is used in Stevenson and Wolfers (2007)
as well, and hence we adopt it for consistency.
Regarding sample selection, we consider only the respondents who
have had their first marriages, and we select the 1950-59 marital cohort
and the 1970-79 marital cohort. We then select a subset of respondents
that reside in a set of states that has a clear coding of the year of
switching to the unilateral regime. Some respondents do not reside in
the United States, and we exclude them in the analysis.
To provide an idea of the sample selection process, we report the
sample selection statistics in Table 1. The table reveals that there is
substantial right-censoring: since the survey is taken in the year of
2001, marriages that do not end by 2001 does not reveal its duration
in the data. In our sample, about half of the duration observations are
censored. The significant right-censoring forbids us to reliably infer
the whole uncensored duration distribution or its summary statistics
such as the median or mean. Consequently, we do not attempt to
estimate parametric duration models of marriage as in Lillard (1993)
or Georgellis (1996). Instead, we compare only the left tail of the
duration distribution across legal regimes and marital cohort, which
is free from the right-censoring problem.
The regime coding used in this paper follows that in Friedberg
(1998), which is the same used in many subsequent research such
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as Stevenson and Wolfers (2006). It should be noted there are some
minor discrepancies between the exact year of regime switching used
by different authors, due to the fact that the exact terms of unilateral
divorce are heterogeneous. However, in this paper, our identification
strategy does not exploit information on the exact year of regime
change, thus being free of this definitional issue. We define a dummy
variable “Uni1980” which is 1 if the state is in the unilateral regime on
or before 1980, and 0 otherwise.
3.2 Difference-in-Difference Plots
Let c ∈ {0, 1} denote the cohort (0 for the 1950-59 cohort, 1 for the
1970-79 cohort). Let s ∈ {0, 1} denote the legal regime as in the year
1980: that is, s = 0 for the states which remain in the consensus regime
by 1980, s = 1 for the states which switched to the unilateral regime
on or before 1980.
The 1950-59 marital cohort did not experience unilateral divorce
reform in the 1970-80 within their first 10 years of marriage. For
the 1970-79 marital cohort, the respondents in the unilateral regime
are affected but those in the consensus regime are unaffected. This
observation allows us to construct the following DID estimate with
respect to the expected duration:
D = (E[X|c = 1, s = 1, X ≤ x¯]− E[X|c = 1, s = 0, X ≤ x¯])
−(E[X|c = 1, s = 1, X ≤ x¯]− E[X|c = 0, s = 0, X ≤ x¯]) (1)
where X is the duration, a random variable censored to be less than
a duration threshold x¯ ∈ R+. Since we are focusing on unstable
marriage in this paper, x¯ = 10 unless otherwise specified.
Next we show that this DID strategy identifies a front-loading
effect. Front-loading of a distribution refers to a left shift in mass
for a duration distribution with a fixed support. Formally, we define
front-loading by second-order stochastic dominance of the cumulative
density functions (cdfs hereafter):
Definition 1 (Front-Loading). Between two distributions A and B with
the same bounded support X ≡ [0, x¯] and cdfs FA, FB : X → [0, 1], one
distribution is more front-loading if 1x¯
∫ x¯
0 FA(x)dx >
1
x¯
∫ x¯
0 FB(y)dx, such
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that on average, the cdf of A is greater than the cdf of B at any duration
x ∈ X .
The idea behind this definition is that if the value of cdf of one
distribution is on average larger than that of the other distribution,
then the first distribution has relative more respondents having small
marital durations.
This definition requires the two distributions to have a common
bounded support. For labor market context, the support of the work
duration (tenure) distribution is naturally defined as the time interval
between labor market entry and the retirement age, 60-65 in most
countries, and that it is typically policy-variant. Consequently, the
discussion of whether OJS is front-loaded in the labor market context
is unambiguous. Whereas for a marriage, there is no parallel definition
to retirement age — marriages end idiosyncratically either by divorce
or death of a spouse. To define the support for marriage duration, we
impose a censoring rule by focusing only on the marriages that end in
divorce within a fixed duration threshold, denoted by x¯. This duration
threshold in our main specification is set to be 10 years, since we focus
on the unstable marriages.
Next we show that our DID estimate corresponds our front-loading
definition.
Proposition 1. Let Fcs(x) = Pr(X|C = c, S = s, X ≤ x). The DID
estimate can be reexpressed as:
D =
∫ x¯
0
[(F10(x)− F11(x))− (F00(x)− F01(x))]dx (2)
The proof of Proposition 1 direct follows from integration by parts.
According to this result, the DID estimate evaluates how the unilateral
distribution is front-loaded relative to the consensus distribution for
the 1970-79 cohort, and then compare this front-loading measure
against the counterpart of the 1950-59 cohort. Unilateral divorce has a
front-loading effect if D < 0 (notice the reversal in sign).
Figure 3 plots the cumulative divorce probabilities by first marital
duration, defined as the year of first termination minus the year of
first marriage. In the figure, the first panel is the 1950-59 cohort, and
the second panel is the 1970-59 cohort; both panels plots two series
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representing the unilateral and consensus regime respectively. For
each marital cohort and at each given duration, the unilateral regime
has a higher cumulative divorce probability than the consensus regime.
Across marital cohorts, there is a large increase in cumulative divorce
probability for both regimes. However, the increase is heterogeneous
across the two regimes: for the 1950-59 cohort, the two series diverge
with respect to marital duration, while the 1970-79 cohort does not
show convergence.
After censoring, we plot Figure 4 to show the graph of the function
d, defined by:
d(x) ≡ 10 ∗ [(F10(x)− F11(x))− (F00(x)− F01(x))]
which is the integrand in Equation 2 multiplied by x¯ = 10. As
illustrated by the derivations above, its average over the support
Y ≡ [0, 10] is the DID estimate. A negative value indicates a front-
loading effect.
We then study whether the catalyst effect in the unilateral regime
cleanse out the unstable marriages, leaving only the stable marriages
by selection. Figure 5 shows a similar graph with the threshold set at
x¯ = 20. The graphs of d has a large jump from being negative to being
positive at around x = 10, which indicates that unilateral divorce has
more stable long-run marriages than consensus regime, after netting
cohort and state effects.
Finally, we study remarriages. Among the respondents who marry
twice or more, we evaluate the duration to second marriage for ac-
cording to the following definition:
Duration to Second Marriagei =
Year of Second Marriagei − Year of First Terminationi (3)
Based on this definition, we evaluate an analogous DID estimate
and plot it in Figure 6. The figure shows that unilateral divorce causes
faster remarriages. Similar to the previous figures, we multiply the
raw DID by 10 in order to conciliate with the regression DID estimates.
The graph of the DID estimate is sharply negative for the first few
years then quickly returns to a level close to zero.
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4 Regressions
4.1 First Marital Duration
The DID analysis can be straightforwardly extended to include co-
variates. Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of a set of individual-level
regressions. The dependent variable is first marital duration; we
run this regression with a subsample whose first marital duration
is less than or equal to 10 years. Column 1 is the base regression
with ”Uni1980” being the legal regime dummy, 1 if the state becomes
unilateral by the year of 1980. Post is a cohort dummy which is 1 if the
individual belongs to the 1970-79 marital cohort, 0 if he/she belongs
to the 1950-59 marital cohort. The specification of this base regression
is:
First Marital Durationi =
β0 + β1Uni1980i + β2Posti + β3Uni1980i ∗ Posti + εi (4)
Standard arguments imply that our parameter of interest, β3, cor-
responds to our previous DID estimate; while β1, β2 capture fixed
legal regime effect and time trend respectively. Column 2 adds a
standard set of individual-level covariates to the base specification in
order to control for confounders; the list of covariates includes gender,
race, education (whether the repsondent has a college degree) and
age. Since there can be across-cohort or across-regime differences in
these individual-level covariates, we need to control for them which
do affect marital duration. Column 2 also controls for the local sex
ratio. For each respondent, the local sex ratio is computed as the
sex ratio of all respondents inside his/her residing state, for his/her
respective cohort. This variable serves to capture the important part
of local marriage market conditions. Column 3 adds state dummies to
the regression. The state dummies absorb the state-level unobserved
heterogeneity in marital duration that may not be entirely captured by
the legal regime dummy and the local sex ratio. To avoid collinearity,
we drop the legal regime dummy and the local sex ratio, and hence
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the specification becomes:
First Marital Durationi =
β0 +
S
∑
s=1
dsi + β2Posti + β3Uni1980i ∗ Posti + Xiβ+ εi (5)
where dsi = 1 if the respondent i resides in state s, 0 otherwise; Xi are
a vector of individual-level covariates.
These specifications provide similar estimates of the effect of uni-
lateral divorce on expected marital duration of about −0.6 (in years).
These figures are consistent with the magnitudes identified from from
the previous DID graphs. While slightly more than half a year may
appear to be small relative to the entire marital distribution with
duration less than or equal to 10 years, it should be noted that the
marital duration distribution is rather stable across groups defined
by observables, unlike marriage and divorce rates. In particular, the
standard deviation of mean marital duration across states are only 1.54
years and 1.2 years for the 1950-59 and 1970-79 cohorts respectively,
so that our estimates are moderately large.
We then consider heterogeneous treatment effects. Table 3 reports
the estimates by gender, race, and education. We find that the treat-
ment effects are large for females, non-white, and those without a
college degree — for non-whites, the estimate is particularly large,
with a value of -1.724 years. While the effects for males, white, and col-
lege graduates are smaller and mostly statistically insignificant from
zero. This finding is consistent with a hypothesis that disadvantaged
groups are more likely to benefit from unilateral divorce.
4.2 Remarriage
We then repeat the same exercises for the timing to remarriages. Using
duration to second marriage, defined in the previous section, as the
dependent variable, Table 4 reports the DID estimates of the effect
of unilateral divorce on the duration to second marriage. From the
previous section, we observe that the front-loading effect on remar-
riages is more concentrated than that on first marriage terminations.
To highlight this fact, here we strengthen the censoring rule by setting
it to be 5 years instead of 10 years.
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We find that adding individual-level covariates and state-level
dummies increases the DID estimate, such that Column 3 reports an
estimate of -2.650 (in years), which is more than half of the duration of
5 years within our selected sample. We then show the heterogeneous
treatment effects in Table 5. We find the opposite result of Table 3: the
catalyst effect of unilateral divorce for remarriage is stronger for males
and whites. Note that because remarriage involves a smaller sam-
ple (only those who terminates the first marriage and the remarried
within 5 years are included), and that the college graduates is a small
portion of the total population, we are unable to reliably estimate a
heterogeneous treatment effect model with respect to education.
4.3 Robustness
Our DID strategy relies on a common trend assumption. To check
this assumption, we consider a placebo DID using the 1940-49 and
1950-59 cohorts. Neither of the cohorts experienced unilateral divorce
in their first 10 years of marriage, thus we expect to find a zero effect.
We perform the same DID analysis and find no effects on both first
marriage duration and remarriage.
5 Model
5.1 Setup
As a conceptual exercise, this section builds a model to capture the
dynamics of marriage, divorce, and remarriage. We consider a con-
tinuum of agents which are homogeneous before marriage. Time is
continuous. The discount rate is r ∈ [0, 1]. Each marriage is character-
ized by its marriage capital y ∈ Y ≡ [0, y¯] which is fully specific to the
marriage. For a person in the divorce process, we denote his OJS offer
also by y ∈ Y if present; if the divorce has no accompanying OJS offer,
we use a notation ∅ to denote the state.
An agent at any instant is in one of four population pools: married
M, divorcing with OJS offer D, divorcing without OJS offer ∅, and
available A (being single and able to marry, i.e. not being involved in
a divorce process). We show the possible population flows by the a
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flowchart (Figure 7). We describe the actions and events at each node
of the flowchart in detail below.
For simplicity, we do not model the contact between opposite sexes
explicitly. Instead, a successful search of an agent leads she to a pool
of ”reserves” —a mass of the opposite sex who are willing to form a
match if she agrees— and that the matched output belongs solely to
the agent; alternatively, the output is interpreted as the agent’s share
of output under a fixed sharing rule. A full, two-sided extension is
left for future research.
5.2 Actions, Events, and Values
5.2.1 Married Agents
An agent in the married pool M is in a marriage. For an agent with
marriage capital y, he involves in two possible actions, namely OJS
and upgrading.
1. The first action is OJS. He controls the OJS arrival rate λ ∈ R+
at a cost cλ(λ). A successful OJS is characterized by a potential
marriage quality x ∈ Y , drawn from a quality distribution with
cumulative density function is F : R+ → [0, 1]. If successful,
then the agent enters the divorce process with the OJS offer x.
2. The second action is to upgrade the existing marriage, which
stands for marital investment. We model upgrading stochas-
tically with arrival rate φ ∈ R+, to be chosen by the agent at
a cost cφ(φ). When upgrading arrives, the marriage capital y
increases to a level G(y) ∈ [y, y¯] and the marriage is maintained.
The function G : Y → Y is strictly increasing.
The two costs functions cλ, cφ : R+ → R+ are both strictly increasing
and convex, and satisfy Inada conditions.
In the equilibrium, successful OJS by spouse feedbacks as part of
the exogeneous separation rate, with an arrival rate
s∗(y) = s¯ + λ∗(y)
where s¯ ∈ R+ is a base separation rate, and λ∗(y) is the policy function
for λ. When the representative agent selects the OJS arrival rate, he
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does not take into account how s∗(y) changes with λ∗(y), but rather
taking it as given.
The flow value for a married agent with marriage capital y is the
sum of several components. The first is the flow output generated by
the marriage capital Q(y), where Q : Y → R+ is strictly increasing and
twice differentiable. The second is the OJS component: after paying an
OJS cost of cλ(λ), with arrival rate λ the agent freely chooses between
an OJS offer and keeping the present marriage; in case he accepts the
OJS offer of quality x, he enters the divorce pool with a value gain of
VD(x)−VM(y). The third is the upgrading component: after paying
an upgrading cost of cφ(φ), with arrival rate φ there is a gain in value
VM(G(y))−VM(y). The fourth is exogenous separation, in which with
arrival rate s∗(y) there is a value gain of V∅ −VM(y). Summarizing
the above, we have the following epression:
rVM(y) = max
λ,φ∈R+
Q(y) + λ
∫
Y
max{VD(x)−VM(y), 0}dF(x)− cλ(λ)
+ φ[VM(G(y))−VM(y)]
+ s∗(y)[V∅ −VM(y)] (6)
5.2.2 Divorcing Agents
We shut down legal costs of divorce, so divorcing receives zero flow
payoff. The divorce process terminates with rate θD ∈ R+. A divorcing
agent with an OJS offer becomes married with the OJS offer being
realized.8
As such, the flow value for an agent in the divorce process is given
by:
rVD(y) = θD[VM(y)−VD(y)] (7)
A divorcing agent without an OJS offer (due to exogenous separa-
tion) becomes single after the divorce process is terminated. Therefore,
rV∅ = θD[VS −V∅] (8)
8It is easy to generalize this model to consider the possibility of losing the OJS
offer during the divorce process, as well as to introduce a positive legal cost.
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In a more elaborate version of this model, we also consider a more
realistic case in which OJS offers have a possibility to expire — it
can be difficult to have the potential partner to wait for many years
until the current marriage is dissoluted. If this is the case, then the
Bellman equation of VD(y) would involve an extra term that governs
the rate of losing the OJS offer, entering the group of divorcing agents
without OJS offer V∅. Thus on top of pure time cost, this feature
helps explaining the differences between the consensus and unilateral
regime.
5.2.3 Available Agents
Being available receives zero flow payoff, and with arrival rate θS→M :∈
R+ the agent receives an offer to marry — with probability another
available individual, and decides whether to enter a marriage. In
principle, the potential spouse could be also available, or she could be
from OJS. Consequently, the flow value of being single is given by:
rVA = θA→M
∫
Y
max{VM(x)−VA, 0}dF(x) (9)
5.3 Characterizations
Proposition 2 (OJS Arrival). λ∗(y) is decreasing in y.
Proof. The first-order condition for λ is:∫
Y
max{VD(x)−VM(y), 0}dF(x) = c′λ(λ)
Since V′M(.) < 0, LHS is strictly decreasing in y. Since cλ(.) is
strictly convex, the OJS policy λ∗(y) is strictly decreasing in y. Whereas
the first-order condition for upgrading is:
VM(G(y))−VM(y) = c′φ(φ)
The presumption that V′M(.) > 0 and the Inada condition jointly
imply that φ∗(y) > 0, such that positive upgrading exists in the
equilibrium.
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OJS among married agents follows a reservation policy, such that
OJS is taken if the drawn offer is better than than the reservation value
R(y). Define the reservation value RM(y) by:
VD(RM(y)) = VM(y)
Proposition 3 (Increasing Reservation Value for OJS). RM(y) is strictly
increasing in y, such that the reservation value of OJS increases with marriage
capital.
Proof. The envelope condition for VD(y) is:
rV′D(y) = θD[V
′
M(y)−V′D(y)]
which implies that for all y:
V′D(y) =
θD
r + θD
V′M(y) > 0
Differentiating the reservation value condition for OJS, we have:
R′M(y) =
V′M(y)
V′D(RM(y))
> 0
Together, the two propositions imply that both the endogenous OJS
arrival rate and acceptance rate strictly decrease when marriage capital
y increases. This is because when the marriage capital is relatively
high, OJS becomes harder to be successful, which in turn reduces the
incentive to attempt on it. These two effects reinforce each other.
Rearranging (7) yields:
VD(y) =
θDVM(y)
r + θD
(10)
Notice that if θD → ∞, such that the divorce process instanta-
neously ends by realizing the OJS as a new marriage, then VD(y) =
VM(y) for all y and that R(y) = y for all y is a solution of the reser-
vation value condition — this is the case in standard OJS models
where the OJS offer is immediately in effect, and that the reservation
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wage is just the current wage. Now because θD/(r + θD) ∈ (0, 1), the
reservation value for OJS is higher than that of the standard case.
Let R∗ ∈ Y be the reservation value of singles, defined by
VA = VM(R∗) (11)
Proposition 4 (Reservation Value for Singles). Suppose that θA→M is
sufficiently large. Then the reservation value of singles is strictly positive,
such that R∗ > 0.
Proof. We have:
rVS = θA→M
∫ y¯
R∗
[VM(x)−VA]dF(x)
Suppose that R∗ = 0, which requires that VA ≤ VM(0). This
implies that:
VA =
θA→M
r + θA→M
∫
Y
VM(x)dF(x)
When θA→M → ∞, VA →
∫
Y VM(x)dF(x) > VM(0), resulting in a
contradiction.
Proposition 4 implies that when being married is sufficiently easy,
the availables will wait until receiving a reasonably good match, re-
jecting some of the received offers.
Proposition 5 (Value after Exogeneous Separation). V∅ < VA.
Proof. The proof is direct: V∅ =
θD
r+θD
VA < VA since θD, r > 0 and
VS > 0 by Proposition 4.
Finally, we go back to prove that the value functions are strictly
increasing.
Proposition 6 (Increasing Value Function for Married and Divorcing).
V′M(y), V
′
D(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y .
Proof. The envelope condition for VM(y) is:
rV′M(y) = Q
′(y) + λ∗(y){
∫ ∞
R(y)
[−V′M(y)]dF(x)
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−[VD(R(y))−VM(y)] f (R(y))R′(y)}
+φ∗(y)[V′M(G(y))G
′(y)−V′M(y)]
+
ds∗(y)
dy
[VD(0)−VM(y)]− s∗(y)V′M(y)
which simplifies to:
[r + λ∗(y)[1− F(R(y))] + φ∗(y) + δ+ s∗(y)]V′M(y)
= Q′(y) + φ∗(y)V′M(G(y))G
′(y)
+
ds∗(y)
dy
[VD(0)−VM(y)]
Suppose that V′M(y) < 0. Then LHS is strictly negtative.
Since there is no benefit in upgrading the marriage, we have
φ∗(y) = 0. This presumption would also imply that OJS is strictly
increasing in y and ds∗(y)/dy ≥ 0 as a result. Since V′D(y), V′M(y)
have the same sign, we have VD(0) − VM(y) > 0. Also Q′(y) > 0.
Therefore, the RHS is strictly positive. So we have a contradiction.
5.4 Simulation
5.4.1 The Baseline
This subsection simulates a baseline model. The purpose of this simu-
lation is to illustrate the basic cost and benefit calculus of marriages
and divorce. The objective of this exercise is to check if it agrees with
the marriage cycle desribed in Cherlin (2009) to a first order in terms
of both stock and flows.
We discretize both the space and time for the simulation. Spatially,
we discretize the domain of marriage capital by introducing a 100-point
grid. Temporally, we discretize the continuous time finely enough to
guarantee that the events (OJS, upgrading, exogenous separation) do
not simulataneously happen within one simulation period.9
We set the base separation rate to be s¯ = 0.1. Given our chosen time
scale of 1/10, this rate corresponds to a 0.1% per-period probability.
9In continuous time, it is not possible to have multiple events with independent
Poisson arrival to happen at the exact same time.
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The mean duration until first arrival is 100 periods or 10 years — we
consider it a reasonable value to capture dissolution of marriages
due to background events. We set θD = 0.5. Following the same
calculations, this implies that divorce takes an average of 2 years in the
consensus regime, which is probably a slight underestimation of the
truth. We set the arrival rate of offers for availables as θA→M = 0.25,
which implies an average duration of 4 years to have a new potential
mate to marry. The interest rate r is set to be 0.05, following the
standard.
For the baseline without OJS and marriage upgrading, we use the
following functional forms:
Q(y) = y + 50
F(y) = 1/100
cλ(λ) = 1000λ2
cφ(φ) = 100φ2
G(y) = min{100, y + 1}
The linear functional form of Q(y) is assumed for simplicity, with
the slope is standardized to 1 by fixing the unit of marriage quality
y. Due to this standardization, values functions can be interpreted
in terms of (present-value) units of output. The intercept, capturing
the base preference of being married, is the only free parameter used
in adjusting the simulation; the results are not very sensitive to this
choice. The coefficients of the cost functions are set such that the
equilibrium λ and φ are comparable in magnitude to the exogenous
separation rate s¯.
The model is solved by value function iteration. Taking the avail-
ables for instance, we rearrange (9) and establish an iteration as fol-
lows:
V jA =
θA→M
r + θA→M
∫
Y
max{V j−1M (x), V j−1A }dF(x) (12)
where the index j stands for the iteration number. For the other value
functions we define similar value function iteration formulas. We start
with an initial guess of the value functions {V0M, V0D, V0∅, V0A} and an
initial guess of {s∗(y); y ∈ Y}. We iterate until convergence.
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Figure 8 plots the value functions of the baseline case. The figure
shows that the value of married is higher than the value of divorce
for each level of marriage capital, which suggests that R(y) < y. The
agent would require the OJS offer to be strictly higher in quality than
the current marriage in order to accept it, because waiting for the
divorce process to complete is costly.
5.5 Simulation
After numerically solving this model, we then simulate it for 1000000
periods to obtain a history of marital states and marriage capital. We
start the baseline simulation (for consensus regime) with the agent
being in the single state. Due to the long simulation, this choice is
irrelevant to our results below. Then we simulate the model with
θD = 5, being 10 times as the baseline, to mimic the effect of unilateral
divorce. The corresponding duration of the divorce process reduces
from 2 years to 0.2 years.
For the consensus regime baseline, the resulting marital duration
distribution has a median of about 6 years, which is close to the his-
torical average median marriage duration in the United States during
1867-1967 (Plateris, 1973). After implementing unilateral divorce, the
median marriage duration reduces to 5.1 years.
In the consensus regime, the ratio of V∅/VA is 0.90, so that being
in the divorce process without an OJS offer is 10% worse than being
single — the representative agent in the former state cannot begin
searching for the next marriage. For the unilateral regime, the ratio
becomes 0.9901, being very close to unity. This is because the waiting
period disappears.
To evaluate welfare, for each regime we evaluate the average value
along the simulation path. We then compute ratio between the average
value in the consensus regime and that of the unilateral regime. We
find a ratio of about 0.91, which suggests that although there are pros
and cons of unilateral divorce (OJS and its reciprocal), the net welfare
effect is positive.
In the consensus regime, the proportion of married is 51%; the
counterpart in the unilateral regime is 57%. This result agrees with
the observation that the married rate does not have large changes.
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In the consensus regime, the OJS population constitutes about
2% of all divorcing population. While in the unilateral regime, this
percentage increases threehold to about 6%. The reason of this small
number is that being married is voluntary. As long as marriage
offers arrive sufficiently frequently, the representative agent would
optimally choose to wait for a better offer. The reservation value
would be relatively high, so that accepted marriages are generally of
high quality. As a result, it would be difficult for a currently married
individual to obtain an even better offer, especially after considering
the time cost of being in the divorce process.
Figure 9 shows the endogenous OJS and upgrading arrival rates
with respect to marriage quality, which are the policy functions. Con-
sistent with our derivation, λ(y) is decreasing in y, while φ(y) is
increasing y except at the upper boundary of the grid y = 100, where
upgrading is no longer possible.
Figure 10 plots the histogram of simulated marriage quality. The
fact that λ(y) is decreasing in y indicates that this group of marriages
are particularly unstable due to OJS, yet their dissolution is favorable
because their value is much lower than that of being single. It also re-
flects on the proportion of OJS among the divorcing individuals, which
is about one-third; the remaining two-thrids are due to exogenous
separation.
Figure 11 plots the histogram of simulated marital duration. The
model is able to generate a right-skewed distribution of marital dura-
tion.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents some evidence on the effects of unilateral divorce
on marriage duration, conditional on eventual divorce. We find that
unilateral divorce indeed serves as a catalyst of divorce for the unstable
marriages. Quoting from Stevenson and Wolfers (2007), there is a large
sociology literature viewing marriage, divorce, and remarriage as a life-
cycle. While certainly this cycle is not deterministic at the individual
household level, this is not very far off as a general description.
What we have presented is not a complete picture of this mar-
ital cycle. Cohabitation is becoming increasingly important in the
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marital cycle. In particular, for people who have divorced, they may
have a distrust on the marital institution and decide not to remarry.
Furthermore, since data on cohabitation is not as complete, and that
considering it requires substantial treatment, we choose to leave this
important issue to future work.
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Figure 1: First Marriages Ending in Divorce, by Year of Marriage
Sample Size Uncensored #Obs Median Marriage Duration
Original Sample 72707
Married Sample 34338 14349 10
1950-59 Cohort (Unilateral States) 1755 886 18
1950-59 Cohort (Consensus States) 2326 1079 22
1970-79 Cohort (Unilateral States) 3155 1742 8
1970-79 Cohort (Consensus States) 3610 1853 9
Table 1: Summary Statistics
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Figure 2: Cumulative Divorce Probabilities by First Marital Duration
(Scaled)
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Figure 3: Cumulative Divorce Probabilities by First Marital Duration
Figure 4: Difference-in-Difference (First Marriage Termination)
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Figure 5: Difference-in-Difference (First Marriage Termination, Cen-
sored at y = 20)
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Figure 6: DID Estimate (Cumulative Remarry Probability by Years
Since First Termination)
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Table 2: OLS Regressions (First Marital Duration, Censored at 10 years)
Dependent variable:
First Marital Duration
(1) (2) (3)
Uni1980 0.207 0.323 0.090
(0.270) (0.275) (0.593)
Post 0.309 0.979∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.348) (0.316)
Male 0.415∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.114)
White −0.310∗ −0.245
(0.166) (0.172)
College 0.037 −0.008
(0.122) (0.123)
Age 0.032∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
Local Sex Ratio −0.570
(3.520)
Uni1980:Post −0.558∗ −0.663∗∗ −0.626∗∗
(0.297) (0.298) (0.298)
Constant 5.640∗∗∗ 4.060 4.060∗∗∗
(0.197) (3.320) (0.933)
State Dummies No No Yes
Observations 2,696 2,675 2,696
R2 0.003 0.014 0.037
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.011 0.019
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect (Marital Duration)
Group Estimate Standard Error
Male 0.018 0.472
Female -1.042 0.392
White -0.305 0.323
Non White -1.724 0.781
College -0.509 0.621
Non College -0.698 0.345
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Table 4: OLS Results (Remarriage): Censored at 5 years
Dependent variable:
Duration to Second Marriage
(1) (2) (3)
Uni1980 1.950∗ 2.220∗ 2.600
(1.150) (1.150) (2.750)
Post −2.840∗∗∗ −1.470 −0.321
(0.927) (1.630) (1.560)
Male 0.122 0.067
(0.544) (0.555)
White −0.336 0.008
(0.886) (0.925)
College −1.450∗∗ −1.530∗∗
(0.577) (0.597)
Age 0.070 0.087
(0.063) (0.065)
Local Sex Ratio 14.400
(16.200)
Uni1980:Post −1.890 −2.350∗ −2.650∗∗
(1.290) (1.280) (1.310)
Constant 11.500∗∗∗ −6.070 5.460
(0.825) (15.300) (4.750)
State Dummies No No Yes
Observations 1,015 1,011 1,015
R2 0.036 0.042 0.091
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.035 0.043
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect (Duration to Second Mar-
riage)
Group Estimate Standard Error
Male -3.85 2.238
Female -1.66 1.66
White -2.53 1.409
Non White -1.168 4.412
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